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The predictability of extraterritorial effect provided by the Johnson deci-
sion does not necessarily mean immunity from attack. The decision does,
however, permit states to afford further protection to out-of-state divorces-
4
States with strict divorce policies25 are thus deprived of one of the last weapons
for repelling the encroachment of liberal foreign divorce laws.20 Strong
religious and political forces press these states to retain control of their cit-
izens' domestic relations27-a traditional area of state concern. But the trend
has been to recognize that strict divorce laws do not solve the complex problems
the law of a state privity is imposed upon persons over whom the state has nio juirisdic-
tion, the judgment is to that extent invalid." (emphasis added).
Cf., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S.
518 (1916).
The Court in the Johnson case evidently did not consider this rule controlling since
no reference was made in the opinion to the Bigelow case. In effect, however, Johtgsoo
did allow Florida to "impose privity" upon the daughter who was not under the juris-
diction of the Florida court. Without the limitation of the Johnson rule to the "status,"
or in rem, aspect of the divorce decree as suggested, conflict with the Bigelow rule
would be inescapable.
24. See p. 241 supra.
25. The "strictness" of a state's divorce policy is most vividly mirrored in the range
of permissible grounds for divorce. Thus, adultery is the sole ground in New York
whereas in Kentucky there are no less than fifteen available grounds. See 2 VEa~REa,
AMEUCAN FAMILY LAws passim (1932).
26. In the days when Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), was the leading
case on out-of-state divorce, jurisdiction over one party who had "fled" the "matrimonial
domicile" did not remove the res of marriage from the home state. The first case of
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) released the home state's hold on the
res of marriage and freed either party to seek a divorce in any state where he wished to
establish his domicile. However, states retained power to entertain challenges to the
jurisdictional basis of a foreign decree. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945). This power is dormant until a proper challenger stirs it to action. A party
who had appeared to contest the divorce could not subsequently attack. Sherrer v.
Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). Similarly, a party who had' acted in reliance on the
foreign decree and remarried was estopped from later challenge. E.g., Drummond v.
Lynch, 82 F.2d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1936); Loftis v. Dearing, 184 Tenn. 474,
201 S.W.2d 655 (1947). Parties who acquiesced to the decree, or were guilty of fraud or
collusion in procuring the decree were also estopped. E.g., Newcomer v. Newcomer,
199 Iowa 290, 294, 201 N.W. 579, 581 (1925) ; Burton v. Burton, 176 Okla. 494, 497,
56 P.2d 385, 388 (1936). Power remained in the local court to determine the standing
of the third party attacker. In many cases, this power allowed states to choose whether
to exercise their right to inquire into the jurisdiction of the foreign court prior to honor-
ing its decree. See note 8 supra. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 461 (U.S. 1873).
That this power has now been taken from the state where the attack is made,
see Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951). In that case the Supreme Court
combined the doctrines of the Sherrer, Coe, and Johnson cases to make it clear
that the vulnerability of the foreign decree depended entirely on the proceedings and
laws of Florida, the state which had granted the divorce. This question was even given
precedence over the doctrine of estoppel customarily applied to third party attacker,
who have colluded, acquiesced, or acted in reliance on the disputed divorce.
27. See GYNNE, HOLY MATRIMUONY AND COMMON SENSE (1930).
[Vol. 61
NOTES
of family disorganization. 2 And giving greater stability to divorce decrees
obtained under more liberal laws seems an appropriate response to the chang-
ing role and function of the American family unit.2 0 If limited to prevent undue
hardship to third persons with legitimate property interests,: ° the Johnson de-
cision may prove a step toward the realistic modernization of our troubled
divorce law.3'
DIVIDEND RIGHTS OF NON-CUMULATIVE
PREFERRED STOCK*
ALTHOUGr directors may pay out dividends unless they impair the corpo-
ration's capital,' stockholders can seldom force distribution simply because
earnings are legally available for dividends. Complaining shareholders, how-
ever, prevail when stock certificates or charter provisions dearly restrict
directors' dividend discretion.2 Absent such limitations, dividends may be 6
28. In considering the problem of marital instability, social scientists have emphasized
patterns of interpersonal adjustment, influenced by social and economic forces. Analysis
in these terms has led many to believe that in most cases the process of marital dis-
solution occurs independently of the law of divorce. For a dramatic presentation of the
breakdown of the marital relationship, see Mowaza, FAuUy DisORGNIZArIoN, 230-63
(2d ed. 1939). See also Beamer, The Doctriw of Recrininalion it; Divorce Proceedings,
10 U. oF KAN. Crrr L. REv. 213, 249 (1941-1942). For a discussion of the social and
psychological factors behind marriage and divorce, see also Llewellyn, Bchizd the
Divorce Law, 32 CoL L. Rnv. 1281 (1932), 33 Col L. Rm% 249 (1933). See also
Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce, note 2 supra. But see, Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg.
Con. 35, 36-7 (England 1790).
29. The law of divorce was born in ecclesiastical doctrines and nurtured in the legal
concepts of fault. Today, neither of these justifications provides a realistic basis for the
legal severing of the marriage bond. The changed position of women, the role and
function of the family unit, and the increased mobility of its members demand a new con-
ception of divorce. See NimxoFr, MArmAGE AND THE F.,asya (1947). On the chang-
ing functions of the American family resulting in a more loosely integrated unit, see
id. at 87-131. On divorce, see id. at 623-68.
30. Of course there may be cases in which the third party attacker is merely a
"straw man" for one of the immediate parties who is herself estopped from further
contest of the adjudicated matter. See Farah v. Farah, 92 N.Y.S2d 187, 19 Misc.
460 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
31. See Roscoe Pound's foreword to A Symposium on the Low of Divorce, 23 Io,,A
L. ERv. 179 (1943).
•Guttmann v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 189 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. dciad, 342
U.S. 867 (1951).
1. "Considerable confusion in corporate law is occasioned by the chameleon-like
nature of the word capital." SciErAmo & IV=NHsmxN, CAsas & MiaitLs on LAVI
& AccouNTING 238 n.26 (1949). For discussion of various dividend restriction concepts,
see id. at 238-74; Sw-mxs, Couo.mvrions 446-54 (1949); B. u.A:rntr, Co.rvAuo:.s
570-91 (1946); K aL,.0CopTRATr Dn .rxns 14-82 (1941).
2. "For a contract to compel directors to declare and pay dividends, the general rule
is that it must be intelligent, explicit and unambiguous." 39 I.. L. Rs. 90, 92-3 (1944),
noting Crocker v. XValtham Watch Co., 315 Mass. 397, 53 N.E_2d 230 (1944); Note,
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extracted if directors have withheld earnings fraudulently or in bad faith.3
And since equity will enjoin arbitrary or unreasonable withholding of divi-
dends,4 stockholders may successfully prove that retention of earnings has
violated the vague standard of "reasonable business judgment."ll But because
courts deem management best qualified to know and evaluate the facts under-
lying informed dividend decision, directors are left with broadest discretion
to withhold corporate earnings from stockholders.0
Corporate retention of annual earnings may hit non-cumulative preferred
stock hardest. While common stockholders are deprived of present investment
returns,7 their aliquot property interest in the corporation appreciates corre-
Minority Shareholder Suits to Compel Declaration of Dividends, 64 Htmv. L. Rnv. 299,
302-3 (1950). But occasionally ambiguous provisions in a stock contract are construed
to limit the drafting corporation's dividend discretion. E.g., New England Trust Co. v.
Penobscot Chemical Fibre Co., 142 Me. 286, 50 A.2d 188 (1946).
3. Kassel v. Empire Tinware Co., 178 App. Div. 176, 164 N.Y. Supp. 1033 (2d Dep't
1917) (directors withheld earnings while fulfilling installment contract to buy plaintiff's
stock) ; Crichton v. Webb Press Co., 113 La. 167, 36 So. 926 (1904) (majority of direc-
tors used corporate surplus to buy patent rights from themselves at inflated prices). And
see Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549, 558 (1890).
4. E.g., W. Q. O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall, 108 Ind. App. 116, 25 N.E.2d 656 (1940);
Hiscock v. Lacy, 9 Misc. 578, 30 N.Y. Supp. 860 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
5. Only a few extreme retentions of earnings have stimulated judicial correction,
Channon v. H. Channon Co., 218 Ill. App. 397 (1920) (dominating stockholder publiely
stated he would declare no further dividends while he lived) ; Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919) (Ford not permitted to subsidize the car purchasing
public with corporate funds). By and large, the management of the corporation call
offer some plausible justification for the retention. Schmitt v. Eagle Roller Mill Co., 199
Minn. 382, 272 N.W. 277 (1937) (surplus aided the efficient running of milling business) ;
Tefft v. Schaefer, 136 Wash. 302, 239 Pac. 837 (1925) (ice and fuel business needed new
machinery to manufacture ice).
6. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 257 N.Y. 62, 177 N.E. 309
(1931) (refusal to distribute dividends despite large earnings and surplus, seven year
absence of dividends, management's hostility toward plaintiffs); Gehrt v. Collins Plow
Co., 156 Ill. App. 98 (1910) (refusal to order distribution from surplus over twice capital
stock after two decades without dividends).
"Judges are aware of their own lack of expertness as business administrators, and are
reluctant to treat managerial acts as abuses of discretion and violations of fiduciary duty
unless the evidence to that effect is clear and convincing." Dodd, The M1fodern Corpora.
tion, Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation, 54 HARV. L. Rav. 917, 925 (1941),
For expressions of this judicial reluctance, see Barrows v. J. N. Fauver Co., 280
Mich. 553, 559, 274 N.V. 325. 328 (1937) ("[A court] is loath to act, unless it is clearly
made to appear that the discretion is, in bad faith, abused") ; Hopkins v. Union Canvas
Goods Co., 104 Pa. Super. 264, 268, 158 Atl. 301, 302 (.1932) ("The Court cannot usurp
[the directors'] function unless they are charged with impropriety and proven to have
been guilty of it."). Moreover, courts may erect a presumption of directors' good faith.
Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 444, 172 N.E. 647, 652 (1930) ("[R]ational presump-
tions will be indulged in favor of the honest decision of such officers.").
7. Particularly in closely held corporations, the retention of earnings may be part of
a scheme to oppress minority stockholders. E.g., Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 205 Alinn.
96, 285 N.W. 809 (1939) ($131,000 of $147,000 surplus ordered disbursed among stock-
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spondingly. And though this investment gain is subject to continuing business
risk, they theoretically can realize their capital appreciation by sale of some
shares at enhanced market prices.8 Cumulative preferred stockholders, entitled
to an annual fixed percentage return on investment regardless of corporate
earnings, probably fare worse. Retention of earnings permits corporate use of
back dividends without payment of an additional return to the preferred
stock.9 Moreover, accruals are often threatened with elimination by corporate
action'0 and thus might not bloat market quotations. But since arrearages at
least block dividends to common stock, they exert some pressure toward dis-
tribution. Non-cumulative preferred stock, however, may not even receive
accrual rights when annual earnings are retained.
Two conflicting theories govern the accrual rights of non-cumulative pre-
ferred stock. One rule, developed by New Jersey courts, interprets the non-
cumulative feature to bar accruals only for years without corporate earnings."1
Under this theory, retained earnings build up a dividend credit for non-
cumulative stockholders which must be satisfied before common stock can
holders). The minority stockholders' need for cash may result in forced sale of securities
to management at an unduly low price. Cf. Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d
531 (1932) (needy widow sold shares to president of company at $125 a share three days
before a cash dividend of $1 a share was declared).
8. If common stockholders do realize a return by selling enough shares to heep their
investment market value constant, they of course lose voting power proportionately. In
actual fact, the market price may not reflect the asset increase caused by retention of
earnings. Investors may be reluctant to bid up the price of stock on which dividends are
being passed though net earnings exist from which dividends could be paid.
9. Whether or not arrearages stem from retention of earnings or absence of earnings,
the cumulative preferred stock receives no return on its arrearages. It receives no "interest
on interest." Cf. Note, 42 -LHnv. L. Rm S05, SOS (1929) (advocating addition of re-
tained earnings to par value of stock for dividend calculation).
10. Reorganizations, mergers, and charter amendments may scale down arrearagez.
E.g., Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F.Supp. 198, aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944)
(arrearages eliminated in exchange for increased liquidation claims). See generally
Becht, Alterations of Accrued Dividends, 49 AiCH. L rxv. 363 and 565 (1951); Dodd,
Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From Vested Rights to Mirage, 57 K~nv.
L. REv. 894 (1944). And appraisal statutes may not adequately protect shareholders
affected. Note, Appraisal of Corporate Dissenters' Shares, 60 Y., LJ. 337 (1951).
11. New Jersey's solicitude for non-cumulative stockholders reached this peal: in Day
v. U.S. Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., 96 N.J.Eq. 736, 126 At. 302 (1924). For the
early New Jersey cases, see Lattin, Is Non-Cumulafive Preferred Stoch I Fact Pre-
fcrred?, 25 ILr. L. RV. 148, 153 n22 (1930). Interpretation of these cases varies.
Compare Note, 4 RuTGERS U RL,. 510, 512 (1950): "[T]he commonly accepted view
in this state of the difference between cumulative and non-cumulative preferred stcd:
[is that] the former has priority over common stock as to dividends legally declared out
of any funds of the corporation so long as the preferred stockholder has failed to receive
the maximum dividend to which he may have been entitled in any year," whereas the
latter gives the preferred stockholder such priority only as to those years in v.ich net
earnings were sufficient to pay such dividends": with B.aLL.krrzu, Comrcmvrxos 523
(1946) ; "The New Jersey cases do not hold that the bare word 'non-cumulative' means
that the dividends are cumulative to the extent earned in each fiscal year."
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receive dividends. 12 New Jersey courts themselves,"8 however, are apparently
shifting toward the dominant Wabash rule, promulgated by a unanimous Su-
preme Court over twenty years ago.' 4 That rule wipes out non-cumulative
stockholders' claims for earned but retained dividends unless the directors'
retentions were arbitrary or unreasonable."r
A recent Second Circuit decision not only adopts but expands the Wabash
rule. In Guttinann v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.,'0 plaintiff non-cumulative
preferred stockholder 17 demanded that his dividends for 1942 through 1947 be
12. The New Jersey cases spoke in terms of retained earnings creating a "dividend
credit." But the factual situations with which the New Jersey courts dealt did not result
in full judicial development of the dividend credit concept. The effect upon the dividend
credit of subsequent corporate losses was not settled. Nor did these early cases concern
retained earnings that had been plowed back into the business. Retained earnings had
been allocated to a readily identifiable, highly liquid "reserve for additional working capi-
tal." Commentators have offered different interpretations of the dividend credit. Conipare
Frey, The Distribution of Corporate Dividends, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 735, 758 (1940)
(dividend credit treated as an arrearage: corporate losses may eliminate the fund legally
available for dividends without wiping out dividend credit), with Berle, Non-Cumulative
Preferred Stock, 23 CoL. L. Rzv. 358, 360 (1923) (dividend credit viewed as an ear-
marking of earned surplus, disappearing when operating losses eliminate earned surplus).
13. In Lich v. U.S. Rubber Co., 39 F.Supp. 675 (D. N.J. 1941), aff'd per curans, 123
F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1941), the tide turned against the non-cumulative stockholder. The
court, applying New Jersey law, refused to find that defendant corporation had unreason-
ably delayed recapitalization. It held that a deficit which existed before recapitalization
precluded payment of dividends, since there were no "net profits or surplus"-a pre-
requisite to dividends under N.J.S.A. 14:8-19. Therefore, non-cumulative stock had no
claim to annual earnings in the years immediately preceding the recapitalization, In dicta,
the court interpreted the earlier New Jersey holdings to mean that the dividend credit
attached only to surplus never used for legitimate corporate purposes. And legitimate
corporate purposes were equated with ordinary business requirements.
New Jersey state courts have picked up the Lich dicta. Agnew v. American Ice Co.,
2 N.J. 291 66 A.2d 330 (1949) (dividend credit held to come only from net annual
earnings, not net earnings plus other accretions to surplus during year); Dohme v.
Pacific Coast Co., 5 N.J. Super. 477, 68 A.2d 490 (Ch. 1949) (surplus created by capital
reduction and by bond repurchase at discount held not to enter into calculation of dividend
credit).
For comment on recent New Jersey developments, see Ashley, The Future of the Law
of Non-Cumulative Stock in New Jersey, 5 RUTGFRS L. RaV. 358 (1951); Notes: 24
TEmp. L.Q. 69 (1950); 17 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 740 (1950); 11 U. or Pirr. L. Rav, 301
(1950).
14. Wabash Railway v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197 (1930).
15. Ibid. The Wabash rule has been accepted by several state courts. E.g., Gallagher
v. New York Dock Co., 19 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Joslin v. Boston & Maine
R. Co., 274 Mass. 551, 175 N.E. 156 (1931). Cf. Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F.Supp.
418 (D. Del. 1944) (under Delaware law, non-cumulative stockholders' rights to surplus
held valueless).
16. 189 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867 (1951).
17. Guttmann's stock contract provided that "the said issue . . . shall be entitled to
receive out of the surplus or net profits of the Company in each fiscal year from June
26, 1922 dividends at the rate of six per cent. per annum payable semi-annually on March
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paid before a 1950 dividend could be distributed to common stock.ls Large
wartime earnings had been retained primarily for a bond repurchase program,
contingent liabilities, and rehabilitation of the railroad's physical plant.10 The
court held Wabash2° to mean that a board of directors could defeat non-
cumulative stockholders' dividend claims by retaining annual earnings for any
appropriate corporate purpose.2 ' Contentions that only capital improvement
expenditures qualified under the Wabash rule were summarily rejected.-
But more significantly, the court went on to hold that once non-cumulative
preferred dividends had been reasonably retained, directors had no power to
distribute them to the preferred stockholders in a later year.Y As a result,
1st and September 1st, which shall be paid or provided for before any dividend shall
be paid upon the common stock, but such dividends shall be non-cumulative... :' Brief
for Appellant, appended Tabular Comparison, Guttmann v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.,
189 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1951) (comparing the contract terms involved in the Gnithnams
case, the TVabash case, and Collins v. Portland Electric Power Co., 12 F.2d 671 (9th
Cir. 1926) ).
Illinois Central stressed the statement in the issuance resolution adopted by the
stockholders in 1922 and in the preferred stock certificates: "[N]o dividends shall be
paid, declared or set apart for payment on the common stock of the Company in any
fiscal year unless the full dividend on the preferred stock for such Scar shall have b-en
paid or provided for." Brief for Appellee, p. 43, Guttmann v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.,
supra. Briefs cited hereinafter refer to this case unless otherwise indicated.
18. Though Guttmann initially alleged arbitrary control of Illinois Central by Union
Pacific, he later stipulated that the Union Pacific exercised no such control, doubtless
because the Union Pacific owned over 50% of the non-cumulative preferred as well as
its 257o of the common stock. Id. at pp. 4-5.
19. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 27-32, Table A; Brief for Appellee, pp. 24, 30.
20. There was no controlling Illinois state law. The requirements of Erie I. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) were apparently satisfied by previous state use of the
Wabash rule, note 15 supra, though the Court did not cite specific state decisions.
21. The Court viewed "appropriate corporate purpose" broadly, including repurchase
of bonds at discounts. Contra: Dohme v. Pacific Coast Co., 5 N.J.Super. 477, 63 A.2d
490 (Ch. 1949) (bond repurchase at discounts held not "ordinary business requirement").
22. Plaintiff based his tangible-intangible distinction on language used in the Vabashs
case: "[I]f those profits are justifiably applied by the directors to capital improvements
.., the claim for that year is gone." 280 U.S. 197, 203 (1930). Brief for Appellant,
pp. 35-42, relying on Diamond v. Davis. 3 N.Y.S.2d 103, (Sup. Ct. 1942 1. at'd, L92 N.Y.
554 (1944) ; Joslin v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 274 Mass. 551, 175 N.E. 156 (1931).
The Second Circuit considered the attempted distinction artificial. It saw no differ-
ence between earnings retained to buy land that may later be sold, and earnings retained
for any appropriate corporate purpose. It refused to hold that non-cumulative stack lost
its claim if there was a need for present capital investment, but not if there was a con-
tingent need that never materialized. 189 F.2d 927, 929-30 (1951).
23. The Guttnann court purported to follow, not expand, Wfabash. "[The JI'aoash
case] held that the contract with the preferred meant that 'if those profits are justifiably
applied by the directors to capital improvements and no dividend is declared vithin the
year, the claim for that year is gone and cannot be asserted at a later date: We It?:e
that as a ruling that the dircctors were left with no discretion C,Cr to pay any stch
dividend. For if they had had that discretion, it would surely have been an 'abuse' to
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retained non-cumulative preferred dividends are forever lost, even though
directors at a later date might deem it reasonable to compensate non-cumula-
tive stock for earlier withholdings.
Guttinann bars the subsequent discretion of directors that Wabash left open.
Nothing in Wabash expressly precluded a board of directors that had decided
to withhold dividends for reasons of conservative financial management sound
at the time from reexamining and revising its policy in the light of later events.
24
Dividends not paid out to non-cumulative preferred stockholders when earned
could be distributed to them in the board's discretion at a later date. The
Guttinann rule, on the other hand, precludes non-cumulative preferred stock
from benefiting by any corporate reexamination of an overly conservative
dividend policy.25 Though non-cumulative stockholders must show at least
a board's abuse of discretion to overturn a board dividend withholding deci-
sion, common stockholders can now automatically enjoin any board attempt
to compensate non-cumulative preferred stock when the board's earlier pes-
simism has proved unjustified. As a consequence, a board may well pay divi-
dends when retention is advisable, since it is now or never for non-cumulative
preferred.
pay dividends on the common while disregarding the asserted claim of the non-cumulative
preferred to back dividends." 189 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1951) (emphasis added).
But this logic is ineluctable only if non-cumulative preferred stockholders have a
legally recognized right to demand "back dividends." With such a right, they might
have enjoined Wabash's directors from abusing their discretionary power in not paying
"back dividends." But Wabash expressly denied this right. Thus, there could be no
question of abuse of discretion in the Wabash case, and voluntary payment of "back
dividends" was left open. Moreover, even if non-cumulative preferred stockholders had
a legal right to challenge directors' discretion in the Wabash case, the payments to the
common stock that Wabash permitted need not necessarily have been an abuse, Only
if payment of a common dividend inevitably and forever barred subsequent voluntary
payment of the earned but undistributed dividends to non-cumulative stock would abuse
be clear. But the Guttmann court's conclusion, not its premise from the Wabash case,
establishes the "barred forever" rule.
Moreover, the right of directors to pay subsequently to non-cumulative stockholders
earned but undistributed dividends has been upheld, even subsequent to the Wabash
case. Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 554 (1944).
And Wabash did not distinguish or mention several prior decisions reaching the result
of the Diamond case. E.g., Morse v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 263 Mass. 308, 160 NME
894 (1928); Collins v. Portland Electric Power Co., 12 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1926).
24. Cf. Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aft'd, 292 N.Y. 554
(1944) (directors permitted to pay previously earned dividend to non-cumulative stock).
See Stevens, Rights of Non-Cumulative Preferred Stockholders, 34 CoL. L. I"Xv. 1439
1446-7 (1934) ; and see note 23 supra.
25. "It is undoubtedly true that despite their opportunities for using their positions
for personal gain, the majority of corporate officials have remained loyal to what they
have conceived to be the interests of the shareholders. It is equally true that a situatfotl
in which the shareholder has to depend rather on the conscience of the management
than on his own legal rights is a dangerous one." Dodd, The Modern Corporation,
Private Property, and Recent Federal Legislation, 54 HiAv. L. I.zv. 917, 927 (1941).
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